Air Warfare in the Missile Age Read online

  © 2002, 2010 by the Smithsonian Institution.

  All rights reserved

  Production editor: Robert A. Poarch

  Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

  Nordeen, Lon O., 1953–

  Air warfare in the missile age / Lon O. Nordeen; foreword by Walter J. Boyne.—2nd ed.

  p. cm.

  Includes bibliographical references.

  ISBN 978-1-58834-083-2 (cloth)

  eBook ISBN: 978-1-58834-439-7

  1. Air warfare—History. 2. Military history, Modern—20th century. I. Title.

  UG630.N564 2002

  358.4′009′04—dc21

  2001057625

  A paperback reissue (ISBN 978-1-58834-282-9) of the original cloth edition.

  British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data is available.

  For permission to reproduce illustrations appearing in this book, please correspond directly with the owners of the work, as listed in the individual captions. Smithsonian Books does not retain reproduction rights for these illustrations individually or maintain a file of addresses for photo sources.

  This book may be purchased for education, business, or sales promotional use. For information please write: Special Markets Department, Smithsonian Books, P.O Box 37012, MRC 513, Washington, DC 20013

  www.SmithsonianBooks.com

  v3.1

  Contents

  Cover

  Title Page

  Copyright

  Foreword

  Walter J. Boyne

  Acknowledgments

  Introduction

  1. Rolling Thunder North Vietnam, 1964–1968

  2. Linebacker and Linebacker II The Vietnam Conflict, 1971–1973

  3. The Battle for Kashmir The Indo-Pakistan Conflict, 1965

  4. The Battle for Bangladesh The Indo-Pakistan War, 1971

  5. The Six-Day War The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967

  6. The War of Attrition The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967–1970

  7. The Yom Kippur War The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1973

  8. Continuing Conflicts in the Middle East and Afghanistan 1973–2001

  9. The Battle for the Malvinas The Falkland Islands Conflict, 1982

  10. The Iran-Iraq War 1980–1988

  11. The Gulf War 1990–2001

  12. The Balkan Civil Wars 1991–2001

  13. Conclusion

  Appendix 1 Aircraft and Weapons, 1965

  Appendix 2 Aircraft and Weapons, 2000

  Notes

  Bibliography

  Foreword

  It is both exciting and comforting to read this book. It is exciting because Lon Nordeen’s research has come up with first-person accounts of dogfights and air strikes from all around the world. It is comforting because it is immediately obvious that this is an accurate, well-researched work that explains the subtleties of modern air warfare. The author sweeps across the world aviation stage, relating the terrible conflicts that have taken place and applying his technical, political, and journalistic expertise to explain just what distinguished each conflict.

  Such expertise is sorely needed, for the last four decades of air warfare witnessed a curious paradox. While there have been relatively few new aircraft introduced, compared to the years of World War II and the decades afterward, an extraordinary number of new weapons and tactics have entered the air warfare arena. One reason for this unusual situation is that aircraft have become so prodigiously expensive that it is necessary to keep them in first-line service for as long as possible to amortize their costs. A second reason is that advances can be made in ancillary elements of a weapons system more swiftly and less expensively than in an aircraft. The result is that sensors and air weapons have begun to dictate the terms of progress, and aircraft have been relegated, in many instances, to serving as a platform from which to fight wars with the most suitable weapon.

  Air Warfare in the Missile Age presents a long and discerning look at this development, riveting it to the real world with the detailed accounts of combat. The author uses his long experience and engineering knowledge to interweave the chronology of each war with an intriguing description of the technological developments as they occurred. It is to his credit that his descriptions of weapons, sensors, and the political/military background of conflicts are as interesting as his descriptions of aircraft. In doing so, he makes clear that both missile and aircraft depend in the long run on the training and aggressiveness of the person in the cockpit. One thing comes through in nearly every account: the pilots and crew who fly in combat, no matter under whose flag they fly, are brave and skilled patriots, no less than those who flew in World Wars I and II.

  Nordeen makes masterful use of the variations in the themes of conflicts that occurred over the four-decade period that the book covers. For example, we are reminded that in the Vietnam War, the United States was fighting virtually alone in the air and in the court of world opinion. The battle was difficult because of absurd, self-imposed rules of engagement and because pilots often received tactical direction from the White House. In the Persian Gulf War, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, the situation generally improved, for the United States now headed an extensive coalition of nations, and the rules of engagement were much more sensible. Perhaps most important, the conduct of war has increasingly been placed in the hands of commanders in the field.

  The later campaigns made use of the technical developments of the Vietnam War, such as precision guided munitions and the suppression of enemy air defenses, but they also had the great advantages of modern satellite, airborne, and computer systems for intelligence, communications, navigation, and meteorology In addition, there were far more capable airborne command-and-control systems. The Persian Gulf War, Kosovo, and operations over Afghanistan were in fact the first aerospace campaigns, and of course, the first in which stealth technologies were introduced on a large scale. They also presaged the widespread use of unmanned air vehicles.

  In between Vietnam and the second major air war over Afghanistan, however, there were other fascinating conflicts, including those in the Middle East and on the Indian subcontinent. Although fiercely fought, the wars involving India and Pakistan were restricted in duration and intensity because of the limited resources of those countries. The author’s deep knowledge of aircraft and missiles is invaluable here, for many of them would be unfamiliar to the average reader. The photos of Folland Gnats fighting North American Sabres or F-6s (Chinese copies of Soviet MiG-19s) engaging Indian Su-7s are utterly fascinating.

  The wars between Israel and the surrounding Arab states grew more ferocious with each succeeding conflict, beginning with the Six-Day War of 1967, and continuing with the relatively unknown War of Attrition (1967–70), the October War of 1973, and the later wars in Lebanon. These wars, so bitterly fought, are more important to understand today than ever, for the situation in the Middle East continues to be volatile. A close reading of the author’s account of the Arab-Israeli battles, sometimes recounted on a day-by-day basis, will give the reader insights that are rarely found elsewhere.

  Nordeen also includes fascinating accounts of some air wars that have received less than their share of coverage, including the vicious eight-year war between Iraq and Iran, and the short but bitter Malvinas–Falkland Islands conflict. The war between Iraq and Iran was distinguished by a bloodthirsty disregard of all the conventions of war, for both surface-to-surface missiles and poison gas were employed.

  Air Warfare in the Missile Age presents an enormous amount of detail interlaced with fast-paced accounts of events. The author is very even-handed in his accounts of these conflicts. This is particularly true of the Middle East wars, where Nordeen’s intimate knowle
dge of both Israeli and Arab air forces is evident. This is a book that belongs in every aviation enthusiast’s library, one that will serve as a benchmark of accuracy and completeness for years to come.

  Walter J. Boyne

  Ashburn, Virginia

  March 2002

  Acknowledgments

  The author is indebted to many individuals for their assistance in finding research materials, preparing the manuscript and maps, and collecting the photographs. They include Joseph Bermudez, Shirley Creswell, Rene Francillon, Peter Mersky, Walter J. Boyne, Matt Caffrey, Dr. David Mets, Dr. David Nicolle, Barry Watts, and Steve Zaloga. David Parsons and David Isby deserve special mention for their assistance. Ev Rein of Brickstreet Creative did an excellent job on artwork.

  Introduction

  This book is a general history and overview of the role played by military aviation in the wars of the past four decades, which saw the widespread introduction of tactical air-to-air, surface-to-air, and air-to-surface missiles. It is based on openly available, unclassified sources.

  The major aim of military aviation is to help ground and naval forces gain control over desired territory or sea lanes for tactical and strategic purposes. In so doing, the key is to avoid or eliminate threats to one’s own aircraft, ground forces, or ships while exacting maximum damage on the enemy. Airpower is an essential element of warfare, but most of the time it has been employed in a support role. However, with the increasing range and effectiveness of aircraft, missiles, and precision-guided munitions, airpower has significantly influenced the outcome of the Gulf War, United Nations and NATO peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the latest conflict in Afghanistan.

  Air warfare can be offensive or defensive and has several components, usually operating in concert. Most frequently, the goal of offensive air warfare is the destruction of enemy aircraft, personnel, and materiel. One major component is interdiction strike warfare: bombers, attack aircraft, and cruise missiles strike against important enemy targets—factories, supply routes, ports, railroads, bridges, and the like—to disrupt the enemy’s industrial base and the transportation network supplying battlefields. The U.S. military’s bombing of North Vietnamese transportation routes to stem the flow of supplies to Viet Cong insurgents in the South is one example of interdiction, which has played a role in most air wars.

  A second component of air warfare is air superiority: shooting down enemy planes to allow friendly planes to dominate the air. Air superiority is the task of fighters, which also escort and protect attack aircraft en route to targets. It is in the air-superiority role that fighters generally engage in aerial combat, including interceptor-type combat, beyond the range of visual detection and attack with missiles; or air-to-air dogfighting, at close range. Increasingly, air-defense systems such as the Soviet S-75 Dvina (SA-2) surface-to-air missile system and supporting antiaircraft guns have taken over some of the roles assigned historically to fighters. As a result, to achieve air superiority, air arms have had to perform air-defense suppression—attacks on ground-based air-defense systems—to achieve air superiority.

  The United States attempted to gain air superiority over North Vietnam in the 1960s and early 1970s to protect bombers interdicting supply routes and attacking industrial targets. American and coalition forces did achieve air superiority over Iraq and the former Yugoslavia.

  Another aspect of air warfare is offensive counter-air: attacking an enemy’s airfields to prevent aerial threats. The potency of offensive counter-air attacks was demonstrated in the Six-Day War of 1967, when waves of Israeli aircraft in surprise attacks against Arab airfields destroyed more than 300 planes on the ground in less than two days. This surgical effort virtually destroyed a numerically superior force. Offensive counter-air was also successfully employed in 1971 by the Indian Air Force in the Indo-Pakistan War and coalition forces in the Gulf War. With precision-guided bombs aircraft in hardened shelters are vulnerable, and runways can be shut down with relative ease.

  A fourth component of air warfare is tactical bombing, or close air support, to help troops engaged with or close to enemy units. During the Vietnam conflict, the United States relied heavily on close air support against Viet Cong or North Vietnamese forces. Increasingly, air transportation and aerial refueling have had major impacts on the course of conflicts. Transports made possible the rapid deployment of American and coalition military forces during the Gulf War and in Afghanistan, and have sustained peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and Kosovo. The range and sustainment capability of military transports have been demonstrated in numerous conflicts, from Vietnam to Afghanistan.

  Air warfare must be viewed in the context of a conflict’s greater military and political aims. The advent of air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles altered the technology and tactics of modern air warfare. The political environment not only created conflicts, but often altered the face of the conflict—for example, the rules of engagement that governed U.S. airpower in North Vietnam, or the decision by Israel on the eve of the Yom Kippur War not to launch a preemptive first strike in self-defense. During the Gulf War, the coalition built up overwhelming airpower before it began its attack to drive Iraqi forces out of Kuwait.

  The missile age of air warfare began on 24 September 1958, when F-86F Sabre jet pilots of the Chinese Nationalist Air Force successfully employed for the first time infrared-homing GAR-8 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles to down more than five MiGs of the People’s Republic of China Air Force. Since that time missiles have played an increasingly critical role in air warfare.

  1

  Rolling Thunder

  North Vietnam, 1964–1968

  In early August 1964, North Vietnamese torpedo boats opened fire on the American destroyer USS Maddox, which was on surveillance patrol in international waters. As a result the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff approved punitive air strikes against North Vietnamese naval bases. The Congress of the United States passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, giving President Lyndon B. Johnson authority to commit U.S. military units to Southeast Asia and initiate a sustained air assault against North Vietnam.

  By 1965 it was evident that, under Soviet sponsorship, North Vietnamese defenses were expanding to counter American air, naval, and ground actions. Not only did the Vietnamese Peoples’ Air Force (VPAF) flex its muscles for the first time in that year, but the conflict also saw extensive use of the Soviet-built S-75 Dvina (NATO code name, SA-2) surface-to-air missile system, in addition to the latest Soviet and Chinese radars and antiaircraft guns.

  Vietnam soon became the proving ground for United States and USSR technology and tactical concepts. The Hanoi regime relied on the Soviet pattern of ground-controlled interceptors, radar-directed antiaircraft artillery, smaller-caliber visually sighted automatic weapons, and surface-to-air missiles—all of which were tied into an integrated air-defense network that relied on a great number of radar stations for early warning and tracking of approaching U.S. aircraft. With each passing month, the United States faced an increasingly sophisticated and concentrated air-defense network and quickly found it necessary to modify its tactics and technology to cope with the triple threat of surface-to-air missiles, antiaircraft artillery, and MiG interceptors flown by increasingly skilled pilots.

  The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 1964

  Following the withdrawal of the French from Southeast Asia in 1954, U.S. efforts to support the non-Communist regime in South Vietnam had gradually increased. Up to 1964, U.S. involvement was limited to financial aid and military advisers. However, in 1964 the South Vietnamese government’s inability to defend against the Viet Cong insurgency became obvious.

  U.S. political and military leaders were handicapped by the lack of accurate information on the extent of the insurgency. On 31 July 1964, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a naval patrol to gather further intelligence off the coast of North Vietnam.1 The USS Maddox, a destroyer equipped with special electronic intelligence gear, began such a patrol. On 2 August three North Vietnamese t
orpedo boats closed on the Maddox at high speed and fired at the destroyer with torpedoes and guns. The Maddox fired back at the attacking boats and, assisted by aircraft from the USS Ticonderoga, sank one of the torpedo boats and damaged the other two.2

  Laos

  The 57mm antiaircraft gun was the cornerstone of North Vietnam’s low-altitude air-defense network and has also seen service in the Middle East, Iraq, Iran, and Yugoslavia. The 57mm was most effective at between 1,500 and 7,000 feet and can be aimed optically and by radar. Photo U.S. Army.

  The U.S. Department of State protested strongly to the Hanoi government, warning that any further unprovoked action against U.S. forces would have “grave consequences.”3 Another destroyer, the USS Turner Joy, joined the Maddox to provide increased security, and the aircraft carriers USS Constellation and USS Kearsarge were ordered to the Gulf of Tonkin to join USS Ticonderoga.4 On 3 August the Maddox and Turner Joy resumed patrol, venturing no closer than eleven nautical miles off the coast of North Vietnam. According to official reports, after sundown on 4 August the U.S. ships fought a confused battle with North Vietnamese torpedo boats. The U.S. vessels were untouched, and subsequently there were doubts concerning a second attack by the North Vietnamese.5

  However, to retaliate against this second (real or imagined) attack against U.S. ships in international waters (the Gulf of Tonkin), the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff approved immediate air strikes against North Vietnamese naval bases.6 On the afternoon of 5 August 1964, aircraft from Constellation and Ticonderoga bombed four North Vietnamese patrol boat bases and two oil storage depots at Vinh—one of the most important trans-shipment centers in North Vietnam. Eight torpedo boats were destroyed, twenty-one more damaged, and the oil storage tanks were virtually demolished. The United States did not retaliate unscathed: two naval aircraft were lost to unexpectedly heavy antiaircraft artillery (AAA) defenses.7