Air Warfare in the Missile Age Read online

  Two days after these first U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam, U.S. reconnaissance aircraft detected the presence of thirty Soviet-built MiG-17 fighters at Phuc Yun airfield. The VPAF fighters of the 921st Fighter Regiment had flown in from the People’s Republic of China, where they had been training, to defend against the American attacks.8

  On 7 August 1964, the U.S. posture toward involvement in Southeast Asia changed drastically when the Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, empowering the president to “take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force.”9 Immediately, two squadrons of B-57 bombers were deployed to Bien Hoa in South Vietnam, and several squadrons of F-100 and F-102 fighters flew to Da Nang. In addition F-105 fighter-bombers were deployed to the Royal Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB) at Takhli.10

  Flaming Dart

  By the end of 1964, it was estimated that the Viet Cong controlled between two-thirds and three-quarters of South Vietnam. In 1965 the Viet Cong increased its attacks against both U.S. and South Vietnamese forces. On 7 February a Viet Cong mortar attack at Pleiku killed 8 Americans and wounded 126. Nine helicopters were destroyed along with a transport plane; nine more helicopters and six light observation aircraft were damaged.11

  President Lyndon B. Johnson, infuriated by the attack, immediately ordered retaliatory strikes, stating he wanted them to be “joint,” “prompt,” and “appropriate.” That afternoon, under the code name Flaming Dart I, U.S. and South Vietnamese Air Force aircraft hit the Chap Le barracks in North Vietnam while aircraft from the carriers USS Coral Sea, USS Ranger, and USS Hancock bombed a military camp at Dong Hoi. One U.S. Navy A-4 was lost to ground fire. The Viet Cong struck back against U.S. facilities at Qui Nhon, provoking a U.S. response in the form of Flaming Dart II—strikes by South Vietnamese Air Force, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Air Force aircraft which punished several North Vietnamese targets on 11 February. Two U.S. Navy and one South Vietnamese aircraft were lost during the Flaming Dart II raids to heavy antiaircraft fire.12

  Viet Cong attacks escalated, and the political situation in South Vietnam remained unstable. This led the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend a longer and harder-hitting series of air strikes against North Vietnam. President Johnson approved the Joint Chiefs’ recommendations with restrictions.

  Rolling Thunder, 1965

  President Johnson’s approval for the air strikes—dubbed Operation Rolling Thunder—came on 13 February. On 2 March 130 U.S. and South Vietnamese Air Force aircraft bombed the naval base at Quang Khe and the ammunition depot at Xom Bang. Nineteen A-1H Skyraider aircraft attacked Quang Khe, while forty-four F-105s, forty F-100s, and twenty U.S. Air Force B-57 bombers blasted the ammunition depot. Four aircraft were lost to antiaircraft fire, prompting the United States to reevaluate strike tactics.13

  To minimize aircraft exposure to ground fire, pilots were ordered to fly only one pass over their targets. The approach was shifted from low-level to medium altitudes of between 10,000 and 15,000 feet with pullout from the bombing run above 6,000 feet. At that altitude aircraft remained above the effective range of small arms and light antiaircraft guns.

  Initially, the Rolling Thunder campaign was limited to targets south of the 20th parallel. Only targets on a list prepared by the Joint Chiefs and approved by the secretary of defense and the president could be hit. A revised list was released each week, informing local commanders in Vietnam exactly when, how, and where to attack. U.S. aircraft were restricted from attacking ports and industrial plants, and concentrated on targets supporting logistical flow of supplies to the south such as bridges, storage areas, barracks, ammunition depots, railroad lines, and choke points.

  Heavy strikes resumed on 18 March. These included naval aircraft flying from the USS Coral Sea and USS Hancock in the Gulf of Tonkin. Rolling Thunder VII marked the beginning of sustained U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam, which would continue with several pauses until July 1968. The objectives of these strikes were to raise the morale of the South Vietnamese by showing U.S. support and protection of the South Vietnamese government, impose a penalty on Hanoi for its support of Viet Cong aggression in the South, and reduce the flow of men and supplies to the South.14

  First Blood: Phase One of the Battle for Air Superiority

  In the first week of April 1965, U.S. forces felt the effectiveness of North Vietnam’s Soviet-style integrated air-defense system as MiGs clashed with U.S. aircraft for the first time. On 3 April, as navy planes bombed the Thanh Hoa Rail and Highway Bridge, VPAF MiG-17s tangled with navy F-8 Crusader fighters flying escort for the A-4 Skyhawks fighter-bombers. The North Vietnamese claimed its MiG pilots shot down two U.S. Navy F-8s and damaged a third. They subsequently made 3 April Air Force Day to celebrate this event.15 The U.S. Navy acknowledged the air engagement but reported that only one F-8 had been damaged. U.S. records indicate that Lt. Comdr. Spence Thomas, pilot of the damaged F-8, diverted to Da Nang rather than take the risk of landing his damaged fighter back on the USS Hancock.16

  The next day VPAF MiGs appeared again, and the first blood of air contests was drawn. U.S. Air Force F-105 fighter-bombers from the 355th Tactical Fighter Wing, based at Korat RTAFB in Thailand, flew against the bridge at Thanh Hoa. The F-105s were escorted by USAF F-100D fighters. Out of the haze in a classic ground-controlled attack, four MiG-17s closed on a flight of four F-105s that were orbiting ten miles south of the bridge, awaiting their turn to bomb. The MiGs made a perfect surprise attack on two of the orbiting F-105s, closing to some 3,000 or 4,000 feet before being discovered by the second pair of USAF aircraft. Despite radio warnings the F-105 pilots did not respond. The MiG-17 pilots opened fire with their cannon, downing one of the F-105s and damaging the other enough that it later crashed. The USAF pilots, Capt. James Magnusson and Maj. Frank Bennett, were killed.17 The escorting F-100s counterattacked the MiGs, and a USAF pilot from the 416th Tactical Fighter Squadron claimed a probable kill. North Vietnamese sources indicate that three of the four pilots of the attacking MiG-17 force lost their lives during this air engagement.18

  Analysis of the surprise attack brought several things to light: First, strike aircraft were at a serious disadvantage when laden with bombs, and thus should utilize tactics that took into account the possibility of being attacked by MiGs. Second, strike aircraft needed sufficient warning of an impending MiG attack. (In this case MiG warnings went unheeded by the F-105 pilots.) But sometimes MiGs were not detected until too late, because the United States lacked ground-based radar coverage over North Vietnam. Third, the slow orbit speed and position of the escorting F-100s rendered them incapable of intercepting the MiG-17s before they had damaged the F-105s.

  Realizing now that North Vietnam was not the semipermissive environment that U.S. aircraft enjoyed south of the 17th parallel, the United States began reevaluating North Vietnam’s weaponry and American capabilities. The loss of two F-105s to MiG attack demonstrated the effectiveness of a properly executed, ground-controlled hit-and-run intercept as well as the inadequacy of U.S. tactics. The USAF replaced the F-100Ds as strike escorts over North Vietnam with Mach 2 F-4C Phantom IIs and F-104C Starfighters. These fighters were faster and, in the case of the F-4, longer-ranging, plus they were armed with a better radar and the AIM-7 Sparrow radar-guided air-to-air missile. The air force also deployed EC-121D radar surveillance aircraft to South Vietnam to provide warnings of MiG aircraft.19

  The Adversaries

  The Vietnamese People’s Air Force can trace its history back to a small number of pilots and ground crews who were sent to the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China for training. In 1963 the air force and air defense force were combined into a single arm that included fewer than 100 aircraft, some 1,400 antiaircraft guns, and about twenty radars. On 3 February 1964, the first VPAF fighter unit, the 921st “Red Star” fighter regiment (following the Soviet model, the VPAF regiment was composed of two or three squadrons with thirty-three to sixty aircraft), was established with thirty-six MiG-17F fighters provided by the S
oviet Union. However, crews remained at Mong Tu air base in China to complete their training while their airfield at Phuc Yhen (Noi Bay) in Vietnam was completed.20

  The North Vietnamese force of MiG-17s, when guided into attack position by fighter controllers employing a comprehensive radar network, proved to be a match for the faster, missile-armed U.S. fighters. The MiG-17 (an improved version of the MiG-15, used so effectively in air combat over Korea in 1950–53) could turn faster and tighter in the horizontal than any of the 1965-era U.S. planes. Even though it was subsonic and had a limited fire-control system, the MiG-17F (NATO name, Fresco C) day fighter had a lethal short-range punch of two 23mm and one 37mm cannon. In September 1965 the VPAF opened Kep air base, which became home to the 923rd Fighter Regiment, made up of two squadrons (the VPAF called them companies) of MiG-17s.

  Toward the end of 1965, the Soviet Union supplied North Vietnam with a squadron of MiG-17PF (Fresco D) night fighters equipped with a radar and another equipped with the supersonic MiG-21F-13. These two units formed the reorganized 921 st Fighter Regiment at Phuc Yen air base.

  Like the earlier MiG-15, MiG-17, and MiG-19 designs, the MiG-21 Fishbed was a point-defense interceptor. While the MiG-21’s payload capability and endurance were less than those of Western aircraft design, its air-to-air performance was excellent. At high altitude it could outturn both the F-4 Phantom fighter and the F-105 Thunderchief fighter-bomber. Originally, classified USAF studies projected the loss of three F-4Cs and four F-105s for each MiG-21 downed for air battles at high altitude (30,000 feet).21 The North Vietnamese initially flew the MiG-21F-13 Fishbed C model armed with an internal 30mm cannon and two AA-2 Atoll (Soviet designation R-13) infrared-guided air-to-air missiles. In 1966 the VPAF received its first MiG-21PF Fishbed Ds, which featured a more powerful engine and better radar but no cannon and only two AA-2 Atoll missiles. The MiG-21 had limited range, simple avionics, and a poor armament load. These limitations, however, did not detract from its effectiveness in its role as an interceptor, especially since VPAF pilots were vectored into attack position by GCI (ground-controlled intercept) controllers.

  While the VPAF and Air Defense Force were the primary threat to American airpower over North Vietnam, the United States also fought several air battles against Chinese fighters. The People’s Republic of China possessed a massive force with thousands of jet fighters, most of which were domestically produced variants of Soviet designs such as the MiG-17 (J-5), the MiG-19 (J-6), and the MiG-21 (J-7). Chinese “MiGs” flying from bases on Hainan Island and the mainland often challenged American aircraft flying over the Gulf of Tonkin or near the China–North Vietnam border. In fact, the first air battle fought between American F-4 Phantoms and MiGs was between U.S. and Chinese jets. On 9 April 1965, a pair of U.S. Navy F-4Bs of VF-96 from the USS Ranger and four Chinese MiG-17s flying from Hainan Island clashed over the Gulf of Tonkin. In this clash one MiG-17 and an F-4 were lost. During the conflict six U.S. aircraft were lost to Chinese MiGs; many of these were surprised while on ferry flights near Chinese territory.

  The primary fighter of the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps during this time was the F-4 Phantom II, which was capable of flying more than twice as fast as the MiG-17 (Mach 2.2 vs. Mach 0.9), had greater range, and carried a powerful radar and armament of four all-aspect radar-guided AIM-7 Sparrow and four AIM-9 Sidewinder heat-seeking air-to-air missiles, but no cannon. USAF and USMC Phantoms flew from bases in Thailand or South Vietnam, while U.S. Navy F-4s operated from aircraft carriers. U.S. Navy fighter squadrons flying from smaller aircraft carriers and some USMC squadrons were equipped with the F-8 Crusader. This maneuverable and fast (Mach 1.6) fighter was armed with four 20 mm cannon and short-range AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, and Crusader pilots were trained primarily for the air-combat (dogfight) mission.22 The USAF also deployed several squadrons of F-104C and F-102A interceptors to Vietnam to provide escort for refueling tankers and bombers. While these interceptors were fast, they played a minor role in the air war due to range and weapon-system limitations.

  Soon after the start of air combat over North Vietnam, the United States realized that its top fighter, the interceptor-oriented F-4, had sacrificed maneuverability for its high-performance and multimission capability. While early radar detection and long-range missile fire could reduce the likelihood of a dogfight, the tight rules of engagement set by U.S. political leaders required visual identification before a missile could be fired. When missiles failed to achieve their high projected kill ratio, U.S. pilots and military leaders clearly recognized that close-in dogfighting was not a thing of the past. The long-range, missiles-only design philosophy that had spawned the gunless F-4 had left it with a serious close-in fighting liability. And anyone who thought the ten-year-old MiG-17 was an obsolete aircraft with no capability against the modern U.S. fighting machines was sadly mistaken. While the foundations of fighter design were being shaken, the United States pressed on in North Vietnam with what aircraft it had on hand.

  For strike missions over North Vietnam, the USAF relied primarily on the F-105D Thunderchief (nicknamed the “Thud”), which flew from several bases in Thailand. This fast (Mach 1.6) fighter-bomber was designed to deliver nuclear weapons but was used in Vietnam in the conventional attack role, carrying two 2,000-pound or six 750-pound bombs. A Thud pilot could engage MiGs with an M61 20mm cannon or AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, but his best defense was effective escort by F-4s or his supersonic low-level dash speed once his bombs had been delivered. The most widely used U.S. Navy strike aircraft during Rolling Thunder was the A-4 Skyhawk. This small, maneuverable subsonic attack aircraft could carry 3,000 pounds of bombs or rockets and was armed with two 20mm cannon. Early in the conflict, the U.S. Navy also employed the propeller-driven A-1E Skyraider, which was armed with four 20mm cannon and up to 4,000 pounds of weapons. However, following heavy losses from ground fire, they were used mostly on rescue and electronic-warfare missions. The A-1s were replaced on large-deck carriers by subsonic A-6 Intruders, which could carry a 12,000-pound weapons load, more than any other navy aircraft, and strike targets at night and in poor weather with its sophisticated radar bombing system. Frequently the USAF and the U.S. Navy/Marine Corps flew their F-4 Phantom IIs in the strike role armed with 2,000–6,000 pounds of bombs and air-to-air missiles.23

  Antiaircraft Artillery

  Antiaircraft guns were by far the most numerous and dangerous threat to U.S. strike aircraft, claiming at least two-thirds to three-quarters of all American aircraft downed. Typically, the antiaircraft fire was heaviest up to 4,500 feet, where aircraft ran into a barrage of steel ranging from rifles to 37mm cannon. Between 5,000 and 10,000 feet, 57mm and 85mm cannon were a threat, and 100mm shells could reach as high as 20,000 feet, all aimed by radar control.24 At the end of 1965, North Vietnam fielded more than 1,300 antiaircraft guns of 37mm or larger, many with radar fire control, plus thousands of smaller guns. These antiaircraft weapons were moved through a multitude of alternative gun positions to confuse American intelligence.25

  By mid-1965 antiaircraft artillery had downed fifty U.S. aircraft.26 To avoid losses to antiaircraft artillery, aircraft had to fly at an altitude of at least 25,000 feet, but to accomplish the strike mission, pilots had to dive toward their target in a predictable path and fly their aircraft to a preplanned release point for accurate bombing. The demands for accuracy were high, because American political leaders were determined to minimize civilian casualties. Attacks from medium altitudes resulted in poor bombing accuracy, so pilots generally rolled in at 10,000 to 6,000 feet using a 30–60-degree dive angle for bombing. To avoid the worst of the smaller-caliber antiaircraft artillery, the U.S. Air Force and Navy directed that pilots pull out from their bombing runs at or above 4,500 feet.27

  Against the radar-directed antiaircraft artillery, a strike aircraft’s only defense was mild “jinking”—abrupt changes in direction, speed, and altitude. Once the radar detected this change and fed the guns new firing c
ommands, the pilot would jink again. Such sporadic maneuvering was fine until the pilot had to stabilize the aircraft’s path over the target to make an accurate attack. Once the aircraft released its bombs, the pilot would immediately jink hard to throw off any tracking radar.

  Antiaircraft fire in North Vietnam. Appearing as a curve as it streaks skyward, this tracer pattern of enemy ground fire was recorded on film by USAF Lt. Col. Morgan R. Beamer during a reconnaissance flight in an RF-4C Phantom over a staging area ten miles south of Dong Hoi. The night photo shows the ground, lighted by a flare, and tracers from the small to medium antiaircraft fire. Photo USAF.

  Aircrews learned very early that multiple passes over the heavily defended targets were not healthy, and they limited bombing runs to one pass—when possible, crisscrossing in differing directions as closely timed as possible to confuse tracking by antiaircraft-artillery gunners. Even so, many of the targets were so densely protected that the North Vietnamese resorted to barrage firing—aiming their guns for the points where they estimated the bombers would release their ordnance—to create a solid curtain of steel through which aircraft had to fly.

  To lessen the effectiveness of the heavy radar-controlled guns, in 1965 the USAF started flying EB-66B aircraft over Vietnam to jam the antiaircraft fire-control radars by radiating high-powered electronic noise on the radar’s frequency. This aircraft was large twin-engine jet bomber which had been converted into a reconnaissance and electronic-warfare platform. The U.S. Navy employed the EA-3B (similar to the EB-66) for electronic intelligence collection and EA-1F Skyraiders and the USMC EF-10B for jamming. Electronic “noise” coming from these aircraft overwhelmed the returning signal from the radar pulses reflected from an attacking aircraft and confused the radar processor. The EB-66B, EA-1F, and EF-10B aircraft generally flew orbits at a safe distance from the target area and sent in their electronic noise to jam the radars.28